This study compares labor and total factor productivity (TFP) in France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States in the very long (since 1890) and medium (since 1980) runs. During the past century, the United States has overtaken the United Kingdom and become the leading world economy. During the past 25 years, the four countries have also experienced contrasting advances in productivity, in particular as a result of unequal investment in information and communication technology (ICT).
INTRODUCTION
Productivity is a key determinant of the wealth of nations. Almost all theoretical and empirical studies that set out to explain the extremely large economic growth and living standard inequalities between countries focus on the differences in productivity levels and growth rates. These studies are numerous and our study, like most others, is based on the traditional "growth accounting" framework (outlined in Box 1). Its contribution is in taking a fresh look at the productivity macroeconomic evidence for France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States in the very long run (since 1890) and in the more recent years (since 1980), thus covering a century during which the United States has replaced the United Kingdom as the leading world economic power, and focusing on the past 25 years during which the development of modern information and communication technologies (ICT) has contributed very significantly, albeit unevenly, to productivity growth.
We have tried in this exercise to make the best use of the estimates of aggregate historical data series going back in all four countries to the end of the 19 th century for output (GDP), employment, working time and investment in physical capital (see Box 2 on Data Sources). As regards the past 25 years, we relied as much as possible on national accounts data. Many of the estimates on which our comparison is based are subject to a great deal of uncertainty and inaccuracy, not only for the most distant periods but also to a significant extent for the more recent ones. We may nevertheless hopefully consider that the orders of magnitude of these estimates, and the ensuing large differentials in productivity levels and growth rates, are fairly reliable and meaningful. One important reason to be confident is the long tradition of statistics gathering in the four countries. Another is that our comparison is limited to the economies as a whole (and the fact that all four countries had reasonably stable geographic frontiers over our study period). Moreover, given the difficulties of measuring physical capital, as well as unknown differences in measurement methods, we re-estimated capital stocks and services and their contributions to growth for the four countries on the basis of the available investment series, using constant and equal capital stock depreciation rates and shares of services in GDP (see Box 2). Similarly, we 4 chose to use the same hedonic price indices (relative to GDP price indices) for computer hardware, software and communication equipment in all four countries, relying on those for the United States, which are arguably those with the largest corrections for improved quality.
In short, we examine productivity growth for the four countries, over the chosen periods and sub-periods, and using three notions of productivity: labor productivity per employee and per hour, and total factor productivity (TFP), measured as the productivity residual accounting for changes in labor and physical capital input. In Section 2, we compare the long-run trends, and then in Section 3, we focus on the evolution during the past 25 years and on the major role played by the diffusion of ICT during this period.
COMPARING LONG RUN PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS
In Section 2.1, we first look at the average long run labor productivity and TFP trends including the years of the 1929 great depression and those of economic reconstruction and recovery after WW2, in order to smooth out the most significant effects of the conflict on production capacities and economic structures); from 1950 to 1973, just before the first oil shock; from 1973 to 1980, the period between the first and second oil shocks; and from 1980 to 2006, the period we will consider in more detail in Section 3. In Section 2.2, we also carefully compare our productivity estimates to those of several other studies.
…over the entire period
From 1890 to 2006, the overall growth of labor productivity was remarkable in all four countries. The levels of productivity per employee and per hour increased by a factor of respectively 10 and 20 in France, 25 and 40 in Japan, 5 and 9 in the United Kingdom and 7 and 12 in the United States (see Table 1 ). The large differentials between the growth rates of employee and hourly productivity reflect the huge decline in average annual working time: by roughly 50% in France (sliding from 3,110 hours in 1890 to 1,540 hours in 2006), by 45% in the United Kingdom (from 2,990 to 1,670 hours), 40%
in the United States (from 2,850 to 1,710) and 35% in Japan (from 2,734 to 1,784).
Over these (nearly) 120 years, Japan experienced the highest average annual growth: close to ours (see Table 1 and Graphs 1 and 2 for our results, and Appendix Table 1 for the   results from Maddison, 2007) .
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In 1890, the level of labor productivity in the United States, whether per employee or per hour, was roughly four to five times higher than in Japan, 50% higher than in France, but 25% lower than in the United Kingdom. 2 At the time, Japan and France had a much larger proportion of their labor force working in agriculture, as compared with the other two countries. It was still the case in 1970 (see Appendix Table 2 ). In 2006, the situation is drastically different. The Japanese productivity level, though still the lowest, is about two thirds that of the United States, and the French productivity level is close to that of the 1 Although Maddison (2007) does not give a level comparison for TFP, he provides estimates of capital stock per capita which seem roughly consistent with ours (see Table 6 .4, page305). We can thus expect that our estimates of TFP levels of the United Kingdom and Japan relative to the United States are also consistent with his estimates for these countries. 2 The relative productivity levels for France, Japan and the United Kingdom found in this study differ somewhat from those mentioned in Cette (2004 Cette ( , 2007 . These results do not alter the commented stylised facts. The causes of these differences are two-fold. First, the data sources are different: those used in the present study are detailed in Box 1 while in Cette (2004 Cette ( , 2007 they are Maddison (1994 Maddison ( , 2001 Maddison ( and 2003 . Second, in order to ensure the continuity of historical series, we chose to adjust them on the basis of growth rates (as indicated in Box 1).
United States, while the British productivity level is noticeably lower (by about 10%) than in the United States.
3
Growth in total factor productivity (TFP) accounts for a major share of hourly labor productivity growth over the past 120 years in the four countries: roughly 50% to 60% in France, Japan and in the United Kingdom and 70% in the United States, while the contribution of capital deepening appears much smaller (see Table 2 ). Overall, it appears that the factors underlying TFP as computed, such as mainly a better educated and higher skilled labor force, technical and organizational changes, knowledge spillovers, better institutions, make a much greater contribution to observed productivity growth than capital deepening per se.
In 1890, the level of TFP was roughly 100% higher in the United Kingdom, but 35% lower in France and 50% lower in Japan than in the United States. Given that TFP growth was relatively slow in the United Kingdom and fast in France, the level of TFP in both countries was close to that in the United States in 2006. Such remarkable convergence did not occur in Japan: for TFP it stopped at about 60% of the level of the United States in the early 1970s, and for hourly labor productivity it came to a halt in the early 1990s. To a significant extent, this can probably be attributed to persistent differences in industry composition. In Japan, as evidenced in Table 2 , low productivity activities, such as agriculture, construction, trade and catering account for a larger share of the economy than in the other three countries.
…by sub-periods
Our estimates of employee and hourly productivity growth and of the contributions of capital deepening and TFP are given in Table 2 , and shown in the corresponding Graph 3.
Only a few analyses provide comparable estimations for the four countries over the last century. As expected, our estimates of productivity per employee are very close to those of Looking more precisely, we see behind these broad similarities substantial differences across the four countries depending on the sub-periods considered.
From 1890 to 1913, France, Japan and the United States experienced similar annual growth rates of productivity per employee (roughly 1.7%) and per hour (roughly 2%). Annual productivity growth was lowest in the United Kingdom, mainly on account of a smaller TFP contribution but also lower capital per employee-hour growth. In the four countries, the shares of the contributions of capital deepening and TFP to productivity growth are roughly similar (respectively 1/4 to ½ and 1/2 to 3/4). Compared to the United States, the level of hourly productivity in France and Japan thus remained unchanged at respectively roughly 45-50% and 20-25% of the U.S. level, while that in the United Kingdom dropped from around 125% to 105% of that in the U.S.
From 1913 to 1950, the average yearly growth in employee and hourly productivity was about 1.9% and 2.8% in the United States, that is much faster than in France (1.0% and 1.8%), Japan (1.3% and 1.8%) and especially in the United Kingdom (0.7% and 1.5%).
Except for Japan, these differences can be attributed to different TFP contributions, since capital deepening increased at about the same rate in all three countries. In Japan, the contribution of capital deepening was very high during this sub-period (roughly 70% of hourly productivity growth). Consequently, as can be seen on Graph 1, the level of hourly productivity dropped in 1950 moderately for France and Japan (to respectively about 40%
and 20% of the United States level), and much more for the United Kingdom (to 65% of the United States level).
From 1950 to 1973, the growth in employee and hourly productivity was particularly strong in Japan (7.5% and 7.4% per year respectively) and in France (4.7% and 5.2%), and much slower in the United Kingdom (2.5% and 2.8%) and in the United States (2.3% and 2.5%). The faster productivity growth in Japan and France can be mainly attributed to faster TFP growth, reflecting in part important changes in their economic structure. For example, it is mainly during this period that the share of agriculture in French GDP declined significantly, and became more in line with that in the United Kingdom and the United States. 4 In 1973, hourly productivity in France and Japan improved markedly to reach a level of about respectively 70% and 50% of that of the United States, and France had caught up with the United Kingdom, which had experienced slower productivity growth.
During the short period between the two oil shocks (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) , employee and hourly productivity growth slowed down significantly in the four countries. It was highest in France (2.6% and 3.4% per year respectively) and in Japan (2.6% and 3.2%), intermediate in the United Kingdom (0.9% and 2.1%) and very low in the United States (0.2% and 0.7%). In all four countries the slowdown in productivity growth is mainly linked to the slowdown in TFP growth, the contribution of capital deepening being almost unchanged or even higher in Japan compared with the previous sub-period. 5 By 1980 hourly productivity in France and Japan had reached a level of about respectively 85% and 50% of that in the United States, and France had overtaken the United Kingdom (which had a level of 75%).
During the last sub-period 1980-2006, employee and hourly productivity continued to slowdown in France and Japan but not in the United States where they both strongly accelerated, nor in the United Kingdom, where employee productivity and TFP also recovered and hourly productivity maintaining its pace. Productivity per employee thus increased fastest in the United Kingdom (2.0% per year), followed by Japan (1.8%), the United States (1.6%) and France (1.5%), while hourly productivity improved most rapidly in Japan (2.4%), followed by France and the United Kingdom (2.2%) and the United States (1.6%). The slowdown in productivity can be attributed to the slowdown in both capital deepening and TFP growth in France, and to capital deepening only in Japan. The acceleration in productivity in the United States and the United Kingdom is also seen in TFP, while the contribution of capital deepening remained about the same in the United States and even declined in the United Kingdom. France continued to experience on average the highest TFP growth, in spite of very significant slowdown (from 1.8% to 1.3% per year).
Consequently, the level of hourly productivity relative to that in the United States increased markedly in France to become equal to that in the United States, and to a lesser extent in Japan and in the United Kingdom, reaching roughly 70% and 90% of the U. S. level.
LOOKING MORE CLOSELY AT PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE 1980-2006 PERIOD
In Section 3.1 we first focus on the changes in productivity growth over the five or ten year sub-periods 1980-1990, 1990-1995, 1995-2000 and 2000-2006 , then in Section 3.2 we consider and comment on the specific contribution to growth of the rapid and pervasive diffusion of information and communication technologies (ICT) during these sub-periods.
Changes in productivity growth
Our estimates of employee and hourly productivity growth and the contributions of non-ICT and ICT capital deepening and TFP are presented by sub-periods in Table 3 , and in the corresponding Graph 4 (in the same format as Table 2 and Graph 3).
During sub-period 1980-1990, employee productivity growth was the highest in Japan with an average rate of 2.7% per year, followed by France and the United Kingdom with a rate close to 2%, and it was the lowest in the United States with a rate of 1.4% (still, a much higher average rate than the 0.2% recorded in the previous sub-period [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] . Hourly productivity growth was much faster in both Japan and France (close to 3%) than in the United Kingdom (2.0%) and the United States (1.4%). The growth differential in hourly productivity between Japan and France on the one hand and the United Kingdom and the United States on the other can be accounted for by a higher TFP contribution (1.5% and 1.7% as against 1.0% and 0.8%), as well as a greater contribution of capital deepening (1.6% and 1.2% as against 1.0% and 0.6%).
Over the sub-period 1990-1995, productivity growth differed widely across countries. In the United States, it was slightly slower than in the previous sub-period 1980-1990, corresponding to a slower TFP growth. In the United Kingdom, employee and hourly productivity growth increased sharply (by 0.7% and 0.8% respectively). A large share of this acceleration is due to a higher contribution of capital deepening. In France, employee and hourly productivity growth slowed considerably, both by about 1.0%. This slowdown reflects almost entirely that in TFP growth (which declined by 1.0%), and probably corresponds to a strong cyclical component given the decrease in GDP growth. The stronger TFP growth characteristic of France as compared to the United Kingdom and the United States thus came to an end in the early 1990s. In Japan, employee and hourly productivity growth also slowed down considerably, by 1.8% and 0.7% respectively. As in France, this slowdown appears to be mostly related to a corresponding slowdown in TFP growth.
The sub-period 1995-2000 is characterized by a significant rise in GDP growth in France, the United Kingdom and the United States (by roughly 1.5% per year), but not in Japan where GDP growth slowed even further than previously (by 0.5%). As in the first half of the 1990s, productivity growth has developed differently in the four countries. In the United Kingdom, per hour and hourly productivity growth slowed down by approximately 0.5% per year, due to a lower contribution of non-ICT capital deepening and of TFP. In
France, it remained stable, the acceleration in TFP being offset by a slowdown in non-ICT capital deepening (by 0.6%). This slowdown may result partly from the implementation of policies designed to enhance the labor intensity of growth, in particular reducing working time and cutting social contributions targeted at low skilled workers (see Cette, 2004 ). In the United States, productivity growth gained approximately 1% due to faster TFP growth.
According to Gordon (2005) , the fact that productivity accelerates in the United States but slows down in Europe can be attributed to several factors, among which are a predominance of ICT-producing industries, public policies that promote entrepreneurship, and better synergy between public research, private research and the financing of innovation. Finally, in Japan TFP growth remained stable and the slowdown in productivity is entirely due to a slowdown in non-ICT capital deepening.
The last sub-period 2000-2006 is characterized by a slowdown in productivity (about 0.4%)
in France and the United-Kingdom and a small acceleration in productivity in the other two countries (by 0.2%). This is mainly accounted for by a smaller contribution of ICT capital deepening in the United Kingdom, of TFP in France, a higher contribution of capital deepening in the United States and of TFP in Japan.
To conclude, the productivity per employee and per hour graphs show that growth was mostly higher in the United States over the period 1995-2006 than in the other three countries, implying that the catching-up process had slowed or stopped. This result is due to higher growth in both ICT and non-ICT capital intensity and also in TFP (mainly due to 13 ICT-producer industries, see below) in the U.S., in comparison with the previous period.
Therefore the success of the United States' productivity growth relative to the other three countries over the period 1995-2006 is due to ICT but not to ICT alone. average yearly rate of 15%, while the GDP price deflator increased at an average yearly rate of 3%.
The contribution of ICTs to productivity
• TFP gains largely driven by rapid technological progress in the different ICTproducing industries.
As stressed in Cette, Mairesse and Kocoglu (2000), the relative importance attached to these two effects in growth accounting analyses depends to a great extent on the methodological choices and practices of statisticians and national accountants in measuring the prices of ICT and using them to construct real ICT investment series from nominal ICT investment. The more the estimation of price changes takes into account the improvements in ICT performance (through substantially upgraded products or new products), by relying in particular on hedonic methods, the larger is the contribution of capital deepening to productivity gains and the lower that of TFP, and conversely.
14 In what follows, we first briefly comment on the estimates of the ICT investment ratios to GDP in the four countries, then on the changes in ICT prices. We finally focus on the comparison of our estimates of the ICT capital deepening contribution to productivity growth across the four countries and with other studies.
a) ICT investment ratios to GDP
Measuring ICT investment in nominal terms already raises a number of difficulties. Putting aside the problem of the availability and reliability of series long enough to estimate 
b) Changes in ICT prices
As already mentioned, perhaps the major difficulty, and hence the major uncertainty, in measuring the contribution of ICT capital deepening to growth lies in the measurement of changes in the prices of ICT products, which have had very rapid quality improvements in the recent past. Price statisticians and national accountants are gradually adopting hedonic methods to adjust prices for such quality improvements. However, there are substantial differences in the way in which different countries apply these methods. To avoid that such differences affect our comparison, and considering that ICT products with basically comparable characteristics are produced or imported everywhere in the developed world, we chose to rely only on the United States national accounts price indices for ICT products. Precisely, we have assumed that, relative to the overall GDP price index, the quality adjusted prices for the three ICT product categories that can be distinguished in the national accounts (i.e., computer hardware, software and communication equipment) are the same in France, Japan and the United Kingdom as in the United States. This method,
proposed by Colecchia and Shreyer (2001), seems realistic enough for developed countries and better than relying on national accounts data for ICT products that are not yet based on harmonized methods for quality adjustment.
Appendix Table 8 gives the overall ICT price average yearly growth rates by sub-period in 
c) The contribution of ICT to productivity growth
The contribution of ICT to labor productivity growth is shown in Table 3 • Over the entire 1980-2006 period, the contribution of ICT capital to productivity growth per hour is greater than that of non-ICT capital in the United States but less than that of non-ICT capital in the other three countries;
• The contribution of ICT capital to average annual productivity growth (per employee or per hour) ranges, depending on the period, from 0.3 point to 0.7 point in the United States and the United Kingdom, from 0.3 point to 0.6 point in Japan and finally from 0.2 point to 0.3 point in France. The ICT investment ratio is roughly the same in the United Kingdom and the United States (see Appendix Graph 1), and the contribution of ICT to productivity growth is also the same. This important ICT impact can be attributed to the significantly faster average annual growth rate of the capital stock due to the rapid decrease in the global ICT price index (see Appendix Table 8 ). Compared to previous studies, the result that the contribution to productivity growth of ICT capital deepening was the same in the United Kingdom and in the United States can be attributed to the improvement in the measures of ICT investment in the United Kingdom from using a more appropriate price index. In France and Japan, the investment ratio is low and the annual growth rate of ICT capital per capita is slightly lower than in the United
States;
• In all four countries, the contribution of ICT capital is the largest over the 1995- Table 8 ) seems to have accelerated the substitution between ICT capital and non-ICT capital;
• Lastly, after 2000, the fall in ICT investment is directly reflected in the contribution of ICT capital to productivity growth. This effect is the less pronounced in France (-0.1% and -0.2% to -0.3% in the other three countries). Except in Japan, this Table 6 ).
As mentioned above, national accountants are faced with a number of methodological problems when assessing ICT investment expenditure and establishing the volume-price breakdown. However, since national accountants have been following the recommendations of the OECD-Eurostat Software Task Force, the measure of investment in software is more homogenous across countries.
CONCLUSION
The results of our study, in spite of being highly aggregated and confirming facts for many of them already known, are nevertheless striking. Possibly the most thought provoking findings are the far-reaching changes in the relative economic situation in France, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom over the long period. While all four countries have experienced very rapid economic growth and extraordinary productivity gains, the past 120 years have also been characterized by the long relative decline of the United Kingdom until WW2, the impressive catching-up of Japan which came to a stop in the 1990s and that by France at least until recently.
At present, total factor productivity is very close in the four countries except Japan, where it is still significantly lower. However, hourly labor productivity is slightly higher in It thus appears that the productivity catching-up process differs strongly among countries and periods. The three important questions are then: (i) why do some countries (and not others) benefit at certain periods (and not others) from a productivity catching-up of the highest country level? (ii) What are the determinants of the speed of this catching-up process when it happens? (iii) Why is this catching-up process achieved for some countries but ends before being achieved for others? Important recent literature suggests that these differences can mainly be explained by the education level of the working age population and by institutional aspects, such as rigidities in labor, product and financial markets.
However, the respective contribution of each of these different factors has not been precisely assessed. There is no consensus in the empirical literature on the effect of labor and product markets rigidities on growth. Numerous studies assess very disparate results: either no effect, or a positive or a negative impact (for a survey emphasising this diversity, with the United States productivity has ended in the last two decades before being completely achieved for France, the United Kingdom and mainly Japan.
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Box 1: The growth accounting approach to estimating the contribution of TFP and capital deepening 9 Solow (1956, 1957) was one of the first to propose decomposing the effects of TFP and capital deepening on GDP using the growth accounting approach. The following equations discuss the decomposition of level and growth rate terms of GDP and productivity. We assume that the production possibilities may be represented using a production function with a multiplicative "total factor productivity" TFP term (for autonomous technical progress and/or other unmeasured factors). Production (or output Y) is written as the following:
where K j and L i represent respectively the volume of j-type capital and i-type labor (or other variable inputs). Assuming that the production function is a Cobb-Douglas production function and labor is homogeneous (which is the case in the present study), we obtain the following relationship:
with a first difference (corresponding approximately to growth rates) of
where y, k j , l and tfp represent the logs of the volume of output, j-type capital, labor and TFP, Δ is the first difference (or annual rate of change) and α j and β are the elasticities of output with respect to the inputs K j and L. We assume unit (constant) returns to scale:
The growth rate of the economy can be written as the sum of the growth rate of each input weighted according to its production elasticity and the growth rate of TFP (or technical progress). Growth accounting can also be presented in terms of labor productivity accounting (assuming constant returns to scale), as follows:
with a first difference equation
where α j (k j -l) represents the contribution of j-type capital deepening to labor productivity.
In order to apply this decomposition, it is necessary to obtain estimates of production and its factors. In macroeconomic analyses, these data are available in national accounts. The sources used in this study are detailed in Box 2. It is also necessary to measure the elasticities of production with respect to inputs. In addition to the hypothesis of constant returns to scale, it is generally assumed that production factors are remunerated at their marginal productivity (at least over the medium to long term), which means that it is possible to estimate the factor elasticities on the basis of the share of their remuneration (cost) in total income (or total cost). Given that labor costs (wages and related social security contributions) represent roughly two thirds of income, it is assumed that ∑ i α i = 0.3 and therefore β = 0.7.
We also assume that the capital K used in year t is the stock of capital installed at the end of year t-1.
TFP is measured as a residual: it measures the contribution to labor productivity that is not attributable to factor inputs. Note that this kind of decomposition is mainly descriptive. Although it does not provide any causal explanations, it can be useful for making comparisons and finding the source of any differentials in productivity levels and growth rates between periods and countries.
In our study, the volume of labor L is written as L = N*H where N is the level of employment and H the average annual working time. The decompositions of productivity are either productivity per employee or productivity per hour, and are conducted using the relations below (first for employment, and then for hours, where the contribution of TFP is the same in both): 
Then the level of TFP is calculated by the following relation:
where α j the elasticity of production for the j-type of capital is assumed constant over the period with ∑ j α j = 0.3 .
Box 2: Data Sources
The data sources on which we rely in this study are historical or national accounts series, which we put together to construct indicators over the very long term or, in the case of ICT, over the past few decades. In order to avoid breaks in these indicators, for sources from the more distant periods we calculated them using growth rates applied to the available historical and national accounts series.
In order to compare the levels of variables, we first expressed them in constant domestic currency terms on the basis of the year 2000, and then converted them into 2000 constant dollar terms, using the PPP exchange rates derived implicitly from PPP 2000 constant dollar GDP estimates provided by Maddison (2003) . Prices of ICT products -The relative ICT price indexes (compared to GDP prices) for France, Japan and the United Kingdom are the same as those taken from the United States national accounts (see Colecchia and Shreyer, 2001, for detailed discussion about this procedure). 
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